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ORIGIN MYTHS, CONTRACTS, AND THE HUNT FOR PARI PASSU
Mark Weidemaier, Robert Scott & Mitu Gulati•

Abstract
Sovereign loans involve complex but largely standardized contracts, and these
include some terms that no one understands. Lawyers often account for the
existence of these terms through origin myths. Focusing on one contract term, the
pari passu clause, this article explores two puzzling aspects of these myths. First,
it demonstrates that the myths are inaccurate as to both the clause’s origin and the
role of lawyers in contract drafting. Second, the myths often are unflattering,
inaccurately portraying lawyers as engaged in little more than rote copying. The
article probes this disjunction between the myths and lawyers’ actual practices
and explores why contracts origin myths might hold such appeal for this elite
segment of the bar.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This project originated in an unexpected place. In our separate work, we were pursuing
questions related to how contracts evolve – or fail to evolve – over time. One of these projects
sought to shed light on why, even in sophisticated markets, contract language often is slow to
change in response to problems. To get traction on that question, two of us (Gulati & Scott 2011)
interviewed lawyers about why they continued to use a standard term in sovereign debt contracts,
the pari passu clause, even after an infamous court decision in 2000 that most believed had
misinterpreted the term. The question posed was straightforward: “Most people think that the
court misinterpreted the pari passu clause. Why didn’t lawyers change it to prevent future
misinterpretation?”
The responses surprised us. Sovereign debt lawyers are elite corporate practitioners and
paradigmatic market actors, so we expected to hear market-based explanations for the failure to
modify the pari passu clause. We expected respondents to identify the function served by the
clause or to explain that what mattered was how market participants understood the clause, not
how a court had misinterpreted it. And some respondents behaved as expected. But many did
not. Senior lawyers in particular often responded by telling stories about the possible history and
origins of the pari passu clause. Their stories linked the clause to remote but significant events,
often using mythic language. Respondents described contract terms as “magic incantations” and
“talismans,” referred to contract drafting as a “ritual,” and, in one instance, likened a search for
the origin of pari passu to the “search for the Holy Grail.”
In this article, we explore two questions prompted by these stories. First, we take each
story literally as an empirical proposition about the world, one that purports to identify the
origins of a particular contracting practice. Using a dataset of sovereign debt contracts spanning
2
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almost 200 years, we ask whether the lawyers have it right. Do they correctly identify the origins
of an important term routinely included in their contracts? After conducting our own hunt for the
origins of pari passu, we believe the answer is no. Each story contains elements of truth,
especially one told by veteran lawyer Lee Buchheit. But none of the stories adequately accounts
for the origins or meaning of the clause (compare Coates 2001:1380).
Second, we explore why these veteran sovereign debt lawyers would tell stories like these
in the first place. Here, we analyze the stories not as empirical propositions but as stories – as
selective interpretations of the professional world experienced by these lawyers. What emerges is
a disjuncture between the stories and our contracts dataset. The stories invoke themes – lawyers
as constrained by history and ritual, lawyers as rote copiers of documents, lawyers who allow
drafting errors to persist for decades – that portray sovereign debt lawyers in unflattering terms.
This alone is puzzling; sovereign debt lawyers are not famed for their modesty. More puzzling
still, our dataset suggests that sovereign debt lawyers behave collectively more like sophisticated
market actors than the stories imply. Instead of blind copying, they appear to engage in frequent
contract tailoring. Instead of chasing the origins of contract terms, they focus primarily on
current practices. And instead of overlooking mistaken additions to contract boilerplate, they
demonstrate a thorough understanding of the language used in their contracts. With that
disjuncture between what lawyers say and what they do as backdrop, we explore why contracts
origin stories might hold such appeal, and we mine the stories for insight into this elite segment
of the legal profession.
II. THE BRUSSELS DRAMA
Court decisions interpreting obscure contract terms rarely produce widespread
consternation. Yet the pari passu clause was not destined for such a quiet fate. The clause
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appears in virtually every modern sovereign debt contract and provides something such as the
following:
These Notes rank, and will rank, equally (or Pari Passu) in right of payment with
all other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness
of the issuer.
In the context of unsecured corporate debt, this language has a recognized meaning. The clause
ensures that the debt will have the same priority as all of the borrower’s other unsecured debt in
the event of a liquidation (Choi & Gulati 2005-2006; Buchheit & Pam 2004). In a corporate
bankruptcy, for example, an equal share of the proceeds of any liquidation will be distributed
among all holders of pari passu-ranking debts (after higher priority creditors are paid). But
sovereign borrowers do not go into insolvency and cannot be liquidated. When a sovereign
defaults, no judicial officer supervises the distribution of sovereign assets in accordance with
creditors’ respective priorities. In the context of sovereign lending, then, it is fair to say that no
one really knows what the pari passu clause means, something that even eminent practitioners
have long acknowledged (Wood 1995:165; Buchheit 1991:11).
In many respects, this is not such an unusual phenomenon. Over time, many boilerplate
contracts become larded with terms that no longer serve a useful function but that drafters are
reluctant to remove (Goetz & Scott 1985:288). One prominent lawyer explains: “Documents are
like ships travelling the oceans: they gather barnacles as they go.” (Wood 2009:8). The pari
passu clause, however, was to become the central feature in one of the most contentious episodes
in the history of sovereign debt. In 1996, the Republic of Peru agreed to debt restructuring terms
with a number of its creditors. Subsequently, a so-called vulture fund, Elliott Associates, that had
not agreed to the terms of the restructuring obtained an ex parte restraining order from a court in
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Brussels that jeopardized Peru’s ability to pay holders of its restructured debt. Elliott successfully
argued that, as an unsecured creditor, it could invoke the pari passu clause to prevent Peru from
making preferential payments to other unsecured creditors with whom Elliott ranked equally. In
effect, this meant that Elliott was entitled to a ratable share of any payment Peru made even
though it had not agreed to the restructuring plan. Afraid of defaulting on its obligations to
holders of its restructured debt, Peru settled, and Elliott received a sizeable return on the debt it
had purchased at a steep discount.
The foregoing description does not do justice to the uproar that followed the Elliott
injunction. The decision sent shockwaves through the sovereign debt world, many members of
which were aghast at the possibility that copycat litigation would complicate future efforts to
restructure distressed sovereign debt. (Concerned players in the market feared that few
bondholders would participate in a restructuring if those who did not participate could claim a
share of any payments made to those who agreed to the restructuring plan.) Sovereign borrowers
and their advisors were quite certain that the pari passu clause did not require borrowers to make
ratable payments to all unsecured creditors and especially not to holdout creditors. Indeed, it is
not uncommon for distressed sovereigns to pay important creditors, like the IMF, without
servicing other outstanding debt (Monteagudo 2010). Yet despite the belief that the Elliott
interpretation was wrong, there was no widely-held understanding of what the clause actually
meant. Moreover, although the Elliott litigation had made the ambiguity of the pari passu clause
painfully apparent, new sovereign bonds continued to be issued with the pre-Elliott version of
the clause (Bradley et al. 2010; Choi & Gulati 2005-2006).
This, then, was the situation after the Elliott litigation: Loans of hundreds of millions of
dollars, involving the most elite law firms and investment banks in the world, were being

5

implemented through contracts whose very architects professed “a degree of agnosticism” about
the meaning of a central contract term (Buchheit & Pam 2004:875). More important, unlike
many other instances of contractual uncertainty, this one had potentially significant
macroeconomic consequences. These events formed the backdrop for our lawyer interviews.
III. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
We became interested in how lawyers explained their use of the pari passu clause for
several reasons. First, contracts scholarship and teaching tends to conceptualize transactional
lawyering as a process of identifying and addressing risk through the design of appropriate
contract terms (Scott & Triantis 2006). From this perspective, the Elliott case raises a puzzle.
The litigation revealed that a common variant of the clause increased the risk of litigation by
holdout creditors, yet sovereign bonds continued to use the pre-Elliott version of the clause. As
academics who teach and study contracts, we wanted to know how these lawyers would explain
why contracting practices did not conform to the theory. Taking our cue from other interviewbased studies of lawyers, we were aware that “lawyers’ reports of their behavior may not reflect
their actual practices.” (Mather, McEwen & Maiman 2001:199; McEwen, Mather & Maiman
1994:152). By juxtaposing the lawyers’ explanations against a dataset of sovereign bond
contracts, we hoped to provide a richer picture of how contracts implemented by sophisticated
market actors respond to legal shocks.
In addition to shedding light on contract evolution and change, the interviews are a
source of information about the nature of sovereign debt legal work. Lawyers are involved in
managing the sizeable risks associated with sovereign borrowing. Thus, our lawyer-respondents
also are “informants” who report their understandings and beliefs about this elite practice setting.
(Mather, McEwen & Maiman 2001:199; McEwen, Mather & Maiman 1994:152). Although we
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had expected them to discuss modern sovereign debt transactions, many of the most senior
lawyers responded by telling stories. This by itself is not surprising. Storytelling is a common
social activity, even among professionals (Economides & O’Leary 2007; Conley & Williams
2005-2006; Ewick & Silbey 2003; O’Barr & Conley 1992a; 1992b; Shearing & Ericson 1991). It
is a means by which people selectively reconstruct and interpret past events so as to create a
particular understanding of their significance (Bennett & Feldman 1981:7). What surprised us
was that many of the stories had the character of origin myths. These are accounts that purport to
explain the origin and continued persistence of a particular cultural or social practice. (Silbey
2007-2008:323-27; Engle 1993:789-92; O’Barr & Conley 1992a:77; O’Barr & Conley
1992b:22). Origin myths often involve remote events “that are not the subject of precise
historical reports” but that adherents to the myth nevertheless view as self-evident. (O’Barr &
Conley 1992a:77).
That is a fair description of the stories told by our lawyer-respondents. Instead of stories
about how sovereign bond deals are “done,” they told stories about the emergence of the pari
passu clause, long ago, during some tumultuous era in the history of sovereign borrowing. For
our purposes, this history includes three principal eras. In the first, external borrowing typically
involved the issuance of bonds in major international financial centers such as London and,
increasingly over the course of the 20th century, New York. Such issuances were common
throughout the nineteenth century and continued until brought to an abrupt halt by a wave of
Depression-era defaults in the 1930s (Cassis 2006:192-93; Gelpern & Gulati 2006:1632;
Rosenberg 1999:240-43). The second era begins after World War II and features unsecured
loans, first by multilateral lenders such as the World Bank, and then by syndicates of commercial
banks flush with petrodollar deposits (Fisch & Gentile 2004: 1054-55). Rather than bonds, most
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sovereign lending during this era took the form of direct loans from a relatively small number of
financial institutions. The third and most recent era was precipitated by a wave of defaults on
these syndicated loans in the 1970s and 1980s. From roughly the late-1980s to the mid-1990s,
banks were persuaded to exchange their defaulted loans for tradable Brady Bonds. Trading in
these bonds reinvigorated the sovereign bond markets, which once again became the primary
means of external borrowing (Gelpern 2009:1101).
IV. TALES OF PARI PASSU
The stories emerged in the course of a larger project involving interviews with over 200
sovereign debt lawyers in New York, London, Frankfurt, and Paris. The interview methodology
is described in detail in Gulati & Scott (2011). Because the most senior lawyers had witnessed
first-hand the evolution of the sovereign debt market and its documentation practices, we
expected that they would have the most to say about why the pari passu clause had not changed
after Elliott. And indeed, their responses differed from those of less senior lawyers. The
difference, however, was that the most eminent and senior of the respondents primarily told
origin stories.
Over a six-year period, roughly two-dozen of these wise men of the field were
interviewed. (Given practice demographics, they were all men.) They ranged in age from late 50s
to early 70s; many were nearing retirement, and some had already retired. Like other
respondents, they were asked why the pari passu clause had not changed, not about the origin or
meaning of the clause. This was partly because respondents might hesitate to provide answers
that might conflict with a client’s interests and partly because leading practitioners had already
suggested that no one knew what the clause actually meant (Wood 1995; Buchheit 1991). But
instead of addressing the impact of Elliott, virtually all of these senior statesmen told origin
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stories.1 To be clear, less senior respondents often echoed the content of these stories. What
distinguished the senior statesmen was that the interviews came to resemble storytelling sessions.
A. The First Story: Pari Passu as an Anti-Earmarking Device
The most frequently-told story was that the pari passu clause is a restriction on the
“earmarking” of revenues and assets. This story also features prominently in the background
literature on sovereign debt documentation (Olivares-Caminal 2009a; Wood 2007; Buchheit &
Pam 2004; Tudor John 1983).
The anti-earmarking story posits that borrowers in the 19th and early 20th centuries often
pledged, or “earmarked,” assets or revenue streams for use in repaying a loan. In our dataset, for
example, Greek bonds issued in 1914 promised bondholders a “first charge” on customs receipts
collected at two ports and on receipts from a tobacco tax. Given the law of sovereign immunity,
these earmarks had limited value, especially when bondholders depended on the borrower to
collect and distribute the pledged revenues. If the borrower diverted these revenues to another
purpose, bondholders often had little recourse. Nevertheless, borrowers often honored their
promises and, when they did, bondholders effectively enjoyed priority over other creditors with
respect to the earmarked funds. Thus, according to this story, unsecured bondholders worried
that borrowers would earmark customs duties, oil or mining revenues, and the like for new
lenders and thereby diminish their ability to repay existing debt.
According to respondents, concerns about earmarking lingered into the latter part of the
twentieth century. To be sure, most contracts for unsecured sovereign loans contain “negative
pledge” clauses, which forbid the debtor to issue subsequent debt secured by its assets or

1

Recent discussions of the clause by groups of eminent lawyers continue to focus on
historical meaning, rather than contemporary usage (see, for example, Financial Markets Law
Committee (2005:7); Wood (2010:21).
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revenues that would rank ahead of unsecured debentures (Scott 1986). But earmarking
arrangements typically do not create formal security interests. For that reason, many respondents
asserted that the pari passu clause was used to prevent borrowers from granting informal
preferences that fell outside the scope of the negative pledge clause.
B. The Second Story: We Copied it From Corporate Deals … Inadvertently
The second most frequently-told story was one of inadvertence and path dependence.
Many respondents would begin by saying (sometimes in hushed tones) that they were going to
share a “dark secret” of their profession: contract provisions from prior deals are often simply
repeated, sometimes without careful thought, in new transactions. This dark secret, of course, is
neither secret nor dark; there is a rich theoretical and empirical literature discussing the
“stickiness” of boilerplate contracts and the fact that such contracts rarely involve anything
resembling the paradigmatic “meeting of the minds” (examples include Kastner 2010; BenShahar & Pottow 2005-2006; Choi & Gulati 2004; Hill 2001-2002; Kahan & Klausner 1997;
Johnston 1990; Goetz & Scott 1985).
According to multiple respondents, the pari passu clause originated in the switch from
syndicated bank loans to sovereign bonds in the late-1980s and 1990s. This switch was
precipitated by a wave of defaults on syndicated loans made by Western banks to Latin
American borrowers. As noted previously, the restructuring of these loans into Brady bonds
created a robust market for bonds and sovereigns once again began to borrow on the bond
markets. Yet because sovereign lending had been dominated by syndicated bank loans for many
years, respondents asserted that the lawyers doing these initial bond deals had no drafting
template from which to borrow. So, the story goes, lawyers simply borrowed standard terms
from cross-border corporate bonds without considering whether these terms were appropriate for
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sovereign borrowers. Because the pari passu clause was a standard term in cross-border
corporate bonds at the time, it was swept along in the wholesale transfer of corporate bond terms
to this new context. And once embedded in sovereign bond boilerplate, there it remained.
C. The Third Story: Gunboat Bankruptcy
The puzzle raised by the pari passu clause is that most modern sovereign loans are
unsecured, yet most commentators believe the clause makes sense for unsecured debt only when
there is the possibility of a bankruptcy or liquidation. Because sovereigns do not go into
bankruptcy and cannot be liquidated, the clause would seem to serve little purpose in sovereign
loans.
Nevertheless, some of the senior statesmen sought to link the origins of the pari passu
clause to a time when there existed something approximating a bankruptcy receivership model
for certain sovereign borrowers. These respondents pointed to the era of “gunboat diplomacy,”
referring to the international politics of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. According to this
story, creditor states during this time routinely employed military force to enforce debt contracts.
As an example, some respondents invoked a joint blockade of Venezuela in 1902 by the British,
German, and Italian navies. Respondents suggested that creditor states often responded to default
by appointing a receiver who would use customs revenues to pay creditors in accordance with
the ranking of their debts. With such a receivership in place, the pari passu clause might serve a
function similar to the one it served in a corporate bankruptcy.
We elaborate on the empirical premises underlying this story in Part V, when we evaluate
its consistency with our dataset of contracts. But apart from that evidence, there is reason to
doubt that gunboat diplomacy was a prevalent or effective means of enforcing sovereign debt
obligations (for relevant studies, see Alfaro, Maurer & Ahmed 2010; Tomz 2007; Mitchener &
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Weidenmier 2005a; Mitchener & Weidenmier 2005b; Finnemore 2003). Moreover, except in
rare instances, such as the threatened use of force by the British against Guatemala in 1913
(Tomz 2007:132-33; Dinwoodie 1970:251), creditor states did not employ force simply because
a borrower had defaulted on its external debt (Tomz 2007:124-47). To the contrary, most actual
or threatened uses of force were related to broader political or territorial disputes, often arising
from personal or property injury suffered by citizens of the creditor state (Tomz 2007:125-32;
Lipson 1985:47-50). As we discuss in Part V, however, the gunboat diplomacy story may be
plausible for a subset of Latin American and Caribbean borrowers in the first decades of the
twentieth century. That, plus the fact that some borrowers clearly were not at risk of gunboat
diplomacy, allows us to explore the validity of this story.
D. The Fourth Story: No More Haircuts … We Promise!
Although Elliott’s interpretation of the pari passu clause has been much maligned, a
couple of respondents suggested that Elliott may have interpreted the clause correctly. As with
those who told the inadvertent copying story, these respondents located the origins of the clause
in the shift from syndicated loans to bonds in the mid-1980s and 1990s. In the course of
restructuring the syndicated loans, smaller banks were pressured by their governments and by
larger lending institutions into dramatically reducing their claims against defaulted borrowers.
According to this story, the smaller banks resented having to take these haircuts and believed that
larger banks were receiving a disproportionate share of the benefits of restructuring.
Determined not to endure similar writedowns in the future, smaller banks demanded that
the new bonds include a package of terms that would protect them against restructuring requests.
For example, the smaller banks reportedly demanded that the bonds include a clause requiring
unanimous bondholder approval for changes to payment-related terms. Such a term makes
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restructuring extremely difficult by enabling a single bondholder to prevent a voluntary reduction
of the borrower’s payment obligations. In addition, respondents suggested, smaller banks
demanded that the new bonds include pari passu clauses. Armed with the pari passu clause, a
bondholder could refuse to participate in a restructuring and then sue those who did for a ratable
share of their payments. In other words, these respondents told an origin story that directly
supported the interpretation advanced by Elliott in the Brussels case.
E. The Fifth Story: The Moving Target
The final story is told by perhaps the most eminent sovereign debt practitioner, the
venerable Lee Buchheit of Cleary Gottlieb. In an article seeking to refute Elliott’s interpretation,
Buchheit and an associate, Jeremiah Pam, attempt to demonstrate that the pari passu clause has
never been interpreted to require pro rata payments to creditors. The story is complex, and we
focus on only two of its main claims. Given its complexity, it is unsurprising that none of the
respondents recounted the Buchheit-Pam story in full. Nevertheless, the story appears to have
been significant. For example, a number of respondents referenced the article as “putting to rest”
any debate about the origin and meaning of the clause, and others echoed portions of the
Buchheit-Pam story in their own narratives about pari passu. The article also formed the basis
for a widely-discussed amicus brief arguing against Elliott’s position filed by the U.S.
government in litigation involving defaulted Argentine debt (Bradley et al. 2010:299; Hagan
2005:314).
1. First appearance in early-1970s syndicated loans
Central to the Buchheit-Pam story is the claim that the pari passu clause appeared only in
secured sovereign loans until the early 1970s. They also assert that the traditional version of the
clause used language consistent with the grant of a security interest, such as “pari passu in point
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of charge” (Buchheit & Pam 2004:894-95). To support their story, Buchheit and Pam embarked
on what they termed “a small exercise in legal paleontology” (Buchheit & Pam 2004:891). Their
“hunt for pari passu” (2004:891) began with a discussion of secured corporate debt in an 1898
English form book by Francis Beaufort Palmer. According to Palmer, when loans made at
different times were secured by the same collateral, earlier lenders had priority over later ones
under English law (and, as Buchheit and Pam note (2004:895-96), possibly under U.S. law as
well). This first-in-time rule was a default rule, and not a very satisfactory one. So loan contracts
included the pari passu clause to assure lenders separated by time that they would share equally
in the proceeds of any liquidation of collateral.
Buchheit and Pam speculate that the clause served a similar function in sovereign loans.
Because sovereign borrowers also issued something akin to secured debt (including the
earmarked loans discussed above), the first-in-time rule may have provoked a similar concern
and prompted drafters to include the pari passu clause in sovereign bonds. Buchheit and Pam
emphasize, however, that the clause appeared only in secured sovereign debt instruments
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and therefore governed only the
allocation of proceeds from a sale of collateral (2004:896).
2. Protection against involuntary subordination
Buchheit and Pam trace the first appearance of the pari passu clause in unsecured
sovereign loans to syndicated bank loans in the early 1970s. In the decades after World War II,
multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank dominated sovereign lending and made
unsecured loans as a matter of policy. For that reason, Buchheit and Pam assert that “there was
no point in adding a conventional pari passu clause” (2004:899). Instead, loans included a strict
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negative pledge clause that prevented borrowers from incurring later secured debt without
securing existing lenders on an equal basis.
When commercial banks entered the sovereign debt markets in the 1960s, they too lent
on an unsecured basis. Buchheit and Pam posit, however, that commercial banks soon became
aware that local laws in some jurisdictions might permit some unsecured bondholders to gain
priority over others without the latter’s consent (2004:903-06). For example, they point to a law
in the Philippines giving priority to debts notarized in a public instrument. Arguably, this law
would enable lenders who followed the requisite formalities to gain priority over other lenders
(2004:914-17). According to Buchheit and Pam, the pari passu clause made a “great leap” into
unsecured loans in the early 1970s primarily, though not exclusively, to protect against this kind
of risk, which they term the risk of “involuntary subordination” (2004:902-05). They interpret
the pari passu clause as a representation by the borrower that no unsecured but senior claims
exist at the time of the loan and suggest that the clause makes it an event of default for a
borrower to allow a subsequent lender to obtain priority in this manner (2004:905). Their
argument has gained purchase in the sovereign debt literature (Blackman & Mukhi 2010;
Olivares-Caminal 2009b).
3. Some concluding thoughts
The Buchheit-Pam story is complex, and our brief discussion does not begin to do it
justice. Rather than explore all of its nuances, we close by noting a link between their story and
those told by our lawyer-respondents. As noted earlier, each story locates the origins of the pari
passu clause in some significant era in the history of sovereign debt. The Buchheit-Pam story is
no exception. By focusing on the clause’s evolution over the past hundred years – what they term
the “pari passu odyssey” (2004:894) – they implicitly suggest that contract language is, in large
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part, a function of major historical events. And they are especially interested in events that are
salient, even defining, for members of the sovereign debt community.
Thus, Buchheit and Pam attribute a major step in the evolution of the pari passu clause to
an infamous episode in which Zaire and two U.S. banks tried to structure a new loan in a way
that would give the banks priority over Zaire’s existing lenders (2004:906-11). For our purposes,
the details of this arrangement are unimportant. What matters is that, as Buchheit and Pam tell
the story, the furor (and litigation) that erupted over the Zaire loan produced two changes to
sovereign debt documentation. Before this episode, they explain, sovereign loans typically
combined the pari passu and negative pledge clauses in a single contract term, perhaps in the
hope that one or both clauses would prevent borrowers from granting any kind of priority to new
lenders. After Zaire, the negative pledge clause was broadened to cover preferential
arrangements that fell short of creating a formal security interest (Buchheit & Pam 2004:910).2
Second, the pari passu clause “split off” from the negative pledge to become a stand-alone
contract provision that drafters came to view primarily as a tool for protecting against
involuntary subordination. According to the Buchheit-Pam story, the modern pari passu clause
thus emerged from what was, until Elliott, perhaps the most significant battle over the meaning
of sovereign debt contract language.
V. CHASING THE STORIES
If our respondents doubted the truth of their stories, or had some ulterior motive for
telling them, they gave no sign of this. Their responses suggested that origins mattered, that we
would solve our puzzle if only we asked the right questions (or undertook the right “quest,” as
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This change to loan documentation has been noted elsewhere in the sovereign debt
literature (Asiedu-Akrofi 1994-1995; Buchheit 1990; Bradfield & Jacklin 1984).
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one put it). The implication was that, if we unearthed the origins of pari passu, all would become
clear.
We took the respondents up on this challenge. In the course of this and other projects, we
have compiled a dataset of over 1300 contracts and disclosure documents for sovereign bonds
issued between 1823-2010.3 The first portion of our dataset consists of the set of sovereign bond
offerings available as of 2010 from the Thomson OneBanker database, one of the most
comprehensive sources of such documents. The database, however, primarily includes issuances
from the mid-1990s to the present. To supplement our data from Thomson, we gathered bond
contracts and disclosure documents from financial archives and libraries, primarily in New York
and London.4 Consulting these varied sources produced a sample that includes 372 issuances
before the end of World War II, 139 issuances from the relatively dormant era of sovereign bond
lending between the end of World War II and roughly 1985, and 851 issuances after 1985.5 The
Appendix provides a fuller description.

3

Sovereign bond documentation includes at least the bond; a disclosure statement that
summarizes key bond terms; and a contract between the issuer and its bankers that specifies bond
terms. Our sample consists primarily of disclosure statements. Sovereigns are not usually
required to disclose bond terms, but most reproduce or describe key terms in detail. In the
modern era, once an issuer elects to make such a disclosure securities laws may require it to
disclose completely and accurately. We therefore assume that the disclosure documents
accurately reproduce the terms of the bonds. We are limited in our ability to test this assumption,
for we do not have the full set of documents for most issuances. In 24 cases between 1896 and
2010, however, we were able to compare the prospectus to the bond or fiscal agency agreement
and found no impact on our coding of the pari passu clause.
4
We visited as many financial archives as funding would allow and gathered or recorded
every document we found. One or more of us visited the Rothschild archives, the HSBC
archives, the Barings archives, the Duke University archives, the UBS library, the JP Morgan
Library and Museum, the Guildhall library, the Harvard Business School library archives, and
the Willard Straight papers at Cornell University.
5
The dataset includes 57 instances by foreign cities or provinces, which could not
necessarily have claimed sovereign immunity. In many cases, however, it would have been
nearly impossible for foreign bondholders to enforce a judgment against these issuers. The
dataset also includes 86 issuances by English colonies or protectorates, against which it may
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We read each prospectus or bond ourselves and extracted the relevant information by
hand. The resulting dataset has limits. For example, archives in Germany, France, and the
Netherlands may also have useful data. Nevertheless, the dataset is adequate to test some of the
origin stories – such as the claim that the pari passu clause originated in the transfer of terms
from cross-border corporate bonds in the late-1980s. And we know of no larger or more
representative dataset that would permit an exploration of the origins of the pari passu clause.
Indeed, our research uncovered what we believe to be the first recorded use of the clause in both
secured and unsecured sovereign bonds.
The following, then, reports the results of our quest to find the origins of pari passu and,
in the process, to test the stories told by our senior statesmen. To lend continuity to the
discussion, we work backwards in time with the stories. Thus, we begin with the shift from
syndicated loans to sovereign bonds beginning in the late 1980s.
A. The Inadvertent Copying Story Revisited
The inadvertent copying story posits that lawyers thoughtlessly imported the pari passu
clause from cross-border corporate bonds and have been copying it in new bond deals ever since.
From the outset, we were skeptical about this story. We have little doubt that modern
transactional lawyers are reluctant to alter standardized terms. To risk-averse lawyers, boilerplate
reflects the accumulated wisdom of prior drafters. Why change it without good reason? But this
is not to say that lawyers cavalierly import boilerplate terms from one contracting context to
another. That practice is anything but risk-averse. Moreover, it seemed implausible that lawyers
with extensive experience drafting syndicated sovereign loans would not know that they would
have been easier for English bondholders to enforce claims. We collected these because we
thought it consistent with the gunboat bankruptcy story for such bonds to include the pari passu
clause. Because we did not detect different patterns in how these various issuers used the pari
passu clause, we do not separately report data by type of issuer.
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need to modify corporate bonds to account for the fact that sovereigns do not go bankrupt. To all
of this, we add only that the lawyers involved worked at elite law firms with significant
institutional knowledge of sovereign debt transactions. This is hardly a perfect proxy for
diligence and legal acumen, but we hesitate to attribute such thoughtlessness to so experienced
and accomplished a group.
When we turn to the contracts dataset, the inadvertent copying story begins to unravel.
The first reason is straightforward: Syndicated loans may have dominated sovereign lending
before the Brady-era restructurings, but nevertheless there were a number of sovereign bond
deals. And the documentation for these issuances routinely though not uniformly included the
pari passu clause. Table 1 reports the number of unsecured bond issuances in our sample, and
the percent that included the pari passu clause, for each decade between 1940 and 2000.6
Although the clause becomes nearly ubiquitous after 1990, it was routinely included in bond
deals well before then. Indeed, in our sample the clause appears in over eighty percent of
issuances between 1960 and 1980, although it did not appear in the relative handful of unsecured
issuances between 1940 and 1959.

6

Note that our sample includes multiple issuances for most countries. Because issuers rarely
change the language of existing contracts, bonds issued by the same country are not independent
observations. We make no formal effort to adjust our data to account for this fact. We do,
however, report both the percentage of issuances that contain a term, and the percentage of
issuers whose bonds include that term, whenever there is more than a trivial difference in these
figures. (If an issuer altered its bonds, we counted it as having used a particular term if any of its
bonds include the term during the relevant period.)
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Table 1. Use of Pari Passu in unsecured bonds, by decade
Decade
1940s
1950s
1960s
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000-Present

Number of issuances
8
3
30
28
108
325
471

Percent with pari passu
0.0%
0.0%
93.3%
71.4%
81.5%
94.5%
99.6%

The law firms involved in issuing sovereign bonds during the 1960s and 1970s,
moreover, also handled the Brady-era restructurings. Before 1980, Sullivan and Cromwell (10
deals), Cravath (6), Linklaters (5), Clearly Gottlieb (2), Allen and Overy (2) and other firms
heavily involved in the Brady restructurings had all acted as issuer’s or underwriter’s counsel in
one or more of the deals in our sample. Lawyers at these firms did not need to copy from crossborder corporate bonds; they could look to the sovereign bond documentation in their own files.
And most of those documents already contained the pari passu term.
Another aspect of our data arguably conflicts with the inadvertent copying story. The
story implies that lawyers paid little heed to the pari passu clause. If that is so, then after being
incorporated into sovereign bond boilerplate the clause presumably would have attracted little
attention until the Elliott litigation brought it into the limelight. Yet our data show the clause
undergoing a series of changes beginning in the early- to mid-1990s. Before then, virtually all
versions of the clause provided that “the bonds rank pari passu with all External Indebtedness,”
or something to that effect. This version of the clause is not readily susceptible to Elliott’s ratable
payment interpretation, because it refers only to the ranking of debt and says nothing at all about
payment.
There are at least two other versions of the modern clause, however, and each poses a
greater risk of Elliott-type holdout litigation (Bradley et al. 2010). A “medium risk” clause, for
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example, might state that “the bonds will rank at least pari passu in priority of payment and in
rank of security.” The addition of the word “payment” makes this clause more susceptible to
Elliott’s interpretation, for it arguably implies an obligation to pay equally-ranking debtholders
on an equal basis. Language like this enabled Elliott to advance its ratable payment
interpretation. A clause in the “high risk” category might append “and shall be paid as such” to
the end of the standard “ranks equally” clause. Such language fits Elliott’s interpretation, for it
explicitly requires equal treatment at the moment of payment.
If the pari passu clause had really escaped the notice of sovereign debt lawyers, we
would expect the clause to remain largely unchanged, at least until the Elliott decision in October
2000. But that is not what we observe. Beginning in the 1990s, the clause began to mutate, with
bonds increasingly incorporating language that was more susceptible to the ratable payment
interpretation. Figure 1 depicts the frequency of use of low, medium, and high risk pari passu
language over five decades, beginning in 1960. (“Risk,” in this case, means risk of being
interpreted in the manner suggested by Elliott.)
Figure 1. Versions of pari passu over time
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Figure 1 suggests that sovereign debt lawyers began to tinker with the pari passu
language well before the Elliott litigation. After the 1980s, sovereign bond contracts increasingly
adopted language that posed a higher risk of being interpreted to require ratable payments.7
These revised clauses may have increased the perceived risk of holdout litigation (Bradley et al.
2010). In other words, the effect of the revisions from 1960 onward was to produce a more
“creditor friendly” clause over time. That lawyers were revising the pari passu clause in this
fashion, of course, does not rule out the possibility that they had thoughtlessly imported the
clause from corporate bond documents years earlier. But the data are hard to reconcile with the
cavalier approach to the clause implied by the involuntary copying story.
B. No More Haircuts… Smaller Banks as the Source of Pari Passu
The second story that locates pari passu’s origins in the Brady-era restructurings
emphasizes the role of smaller banks in the restructuring negotiations. Respondents who told this
story explained that smaller banks resented the pressure applied during these negotiations by
large banks and the official sector, and they demanded the pari passu clause as a defense against
future writedown requests. Our data do not support this explanation for the origins of the clause.
But the story may contain an element of truth. Although smaller banks were not responsible for
the initial inclusion of the pari passu term in sovereign bonds, their frustration may have
contributed to a change in the form of the clause.
Table 1 indicates that the pari passu clause was well-established in sovereign bond
documentation before the restructurings of the 1980s and 1990s. For that reason, we can say with
confidence that smaller banks did not cause the introduction of the pari passu clause during that
7

The frequency with which issuances included medium or high risk language was
significantly higher the 1990s than the 1980s (χ2(1, N=433)=34.7, p < .0001) and higher again in
the decade after 2000 than in the 1990s (χ 2(1, N=796)=34.9, p < .0001). As Figure 1 shows, the
increase occurred in the increased use of the medium risk clause.
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era. This result should not be surprising. We have difficulty understanding why small banks
would have viewed the clause as protection against being pressured into a restructuring.
Syndicated loans had already contained a term similar to the pari passu clause as interpreted by
Elliott – an explicit version called a sharing clause (Asiedu-Akrofi 1992:13-14; Buchheit &
Reisner 1988:501-02) – and this had not provided insulation from large bank and official sector
pressure. Moreover, even if the pari passu clause had offered some degree of insulation, why
would smaller banks have assigned much weight to this benefit? For these banks, the way to
avoid pressure was to become anonymous, so that large banks and public sector officials would
not know whom to pressure. The switch from syndicated bank debt to tradable bonds
accomplished this result.
Despite our skepticism, respondents may have been on to something by linking creditor
ire to the pari passu clause. Smaller banks were surely frustrated by the defaults that led to the
Brady restructurings. No doubt their displeasure was echoed by other creditors. Under those
conditions, one might plausibly expect a more creditor-friendly set of contract terms to evolve.
Figure 1 hints that such an evolution may have taken place with respect to the pari passu term.
Recall that, beginning in the 1990s, bond contracts increasingly employed pari passu terms that
were more susceptible to Elliott’s ratable payment interpretation. To the extent such terms
increase the risk of holdout litigation, they complicate restructuring efforts and increase the cost
of default. The use of such terms, then, is consistent with a story in which angry creditors
demand terms that might reduce the likelihood of future default. But this story is itself
embarrassed by the fact that barriers to restructuring may actually increase the risk of nonpayment by preventing the sort of composition and extension of debts that would permit the
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creditor to at least recoup a portion of the loan On balance, therefore, we remain skeptical of a
story that links increased creditor frustration to the inclusion of the pari passu term.
C. The Anti-Earmarking Story
The anti-earmarking story links the pari passu clause to concerns that borrowers would
grant new lenders favored status by “earmarking” customs and other revenue streams for use in
repaying the new loan. A borrower might make such a promise in a new loan contract, or it
might pass domestic legislation granting preferential treatment to new lenders (Mandeng 2004).
To examine this story, we begin with a bit of history. Our data suggest that the historic function
of the clause was unrelated to concerns about earmarking, which were primarily (if
incompletely) addressed by a version of the negative pledge clause.
1. Pre-World War II Bonds
Many respondents remarked that pre-World War II loans often contained earmarks. Our
data support this claim. One hundred and sixty-four (44.1%) of the 372 pre-WWII bonds in our
sample pledge some asset or revenue stream in exchange for the loan. If such pledges were
honored or could be enforced, the designated revenues would become less available to satisfy the
claims of other creditors, including prior lenders. The negative pledge clause offered unsecured
lenders some protection against this risk. A typical clause might provide that, if the borrower
gave future lenders “a lien on any specific revenue or asset, these bonds shall be secured equally
and ratably with such loan” (Prospectus, Republic of Chile 20 Year Sinking Fund 8% Gold
Bonds, Feb. 15, 1921). Note, however, that this negative pledge clause refers to a “lien,” and
thus arguably covers only formal security interests. The anti-earmarking story suggests that the
pari passu clause offers additional protection against informal preferences like earmarks.
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Whatever the validity of this story in the modern era, it does not appear that the pari
passu clause served this function in pre-World War II bonds. The story presumes that the
negative pledge and pari passu clauses work in tandem to prevent borrowers from granting any
form of priority to new lenders. If that is so, we would expect bond contracts to use both terms
and thereby to protect against both formal security interests and informal earmarks. Yet only one
of the pre-World War II unsecured bonds in our sample includes both terms. When the pari
passu clause does appear, moreover, it rarely imposes across-the-board restrictions on the
borrower’s ability to grant preferential treatment to new lenders. To the contrary, the clause most
often appears when the borrower pledged or anticipated pledging the same assets or revenues for
multiple loans. For example, bonds issued by Tokyo in 1912 to raise funds for railway
construction pledged the city’s revenues as security for the loan and provided that the loan would
rank pari passu with a 1906 loan issued for the same purpose. A similar loan, issued by the
Chinese government in 1911 and also used for railway construction, provided that, if
construction funds ran out, the government would issue a second series of bonds secured pari
passu with the first. We will have more to say about such loans later, when we assess the
Buchheit-Pam story. For now, the important point is that these pari passu clauses only maintain
equal ranking among holders of the specified bonds; they do not otherwise prevent the borrower
from granting preferential treatment to future lenders.
2. Pari Passu in Modern Bonds
Our data on the pari passu term in modern bonds provides further evidence that the
clause did not evolve to offer protection against earmarking. In the first place, the modern
version of the negative pledge clause has been broadened to address preferential arrangements
that do not create formal security interests (Buchheit & Pam 2004:910). Moreover, our data
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reveal that sovereign bonds governed by English law increasingly have employed a modified
version of the pari passu clause that exempts certain legislative acts by the borrower from the
general requirement that unsecured debts rank equally. As an example, consider the following
clause from a 2007 issuance by Ukraine:
The payment obligations of the Issuer under the Notes shall rank at least pari
passu with all other unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Issuer,
present and future, save only for such obligations as may be preferred by
mandatory provisions of applicable law (Prospectus, Ukraine 3.5% Notes due
2018, Jan. 29, 2007) (emphasis added).
As Figure 2 shows for the English-law bonds in our sample, such language has increased in
frequency since the 1980s.8 We do not report data for bonds governed by New York law because
this mutation appears very rarely in those bonds.9
Figure 2. English-law bonds with exception for "mandatory" or other law
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Breaking our data down by decade for simplicity, exceptions for “mandatory” or other law
appeared significantly more frequently in the decade after 2000 than in the 1990s (χ2(1,
N=294)=28.6, p < .0001). Other differences were not significant.
9
We coded a random sample of 124 bonds governed by New York law, only four of which
included this mutation. Each of the four was issued in the London market.
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To understand the import of the italicized language in the preceding version of the clause,
recall that a borrower might earmark assets or revenues for the service of new debt either by
promising to do so in a loan contract or by enacting a law to that effect. Even if we assume that
the standard pari passu clause is designed to prevent earmarking, the italicized language in the
modified clause seems to allow preferential treatment when required by legislation. That leaves a
rather gaping hole in the protection supposedly offered by the clause. After all, it is plausible to
believe that a borrower might enact a law granting favored status to a subset of its creditors. In
2005, Argentina passed a statute (the so-called “Padlock Law”) that arguably forbade the
government to settle with holdout creditors who had refused to participate in Argentina’s
restructuring efforts after its 2001 default (Olivares-Caminal 2009b:757-58; Gelpern 2005:6).
Although not an earmarking arrangement, the statute was similar in that it granted favored status
to one group of bondholders. Yet if Argentina’s bond contracts had contained a pari passu clause
like the one quoted above, the clause might have been interpreted to permit such an action.10
This brings us to our third reason for skepticism about the anti-earmarking story: Market
participants have not behaved as if there is a link between the pari passu clause and concerns
about earmarking. As we noted just above, Argentina’s 2005 Padlock Law arguably required the
government to grant preferential treatment to creditors who had participated in the restructuring.

10

Some senior lawyers have attributed the “mandatory law” exception in English bonds to a
drafting error in which the language was mistakenly imported from corporate bonds. One even
pointed to a widely-read 2005 report by the Financial Markets Law Committee, a group of some
of the most eminent sovereign debt lawyers in the U.K., which explicitly stated that this language
makes no sense in sovereign bonds. The modified version of the pari passu clause discussed in
the text, however, varies in its form and potential meaning, and it is hard to square such variance
with a drafting mistake. Plus, it is one thing to say that an isolated bond contract or two might
contain unnoticed errors. But over forty percent of the bonds in a thriving, high-volume market?
Finally, the FMLC report seems to have had no impact on drafting practices. A slightly higher
percentage of issuers in our sample used the “mandatory law” exception in the five years after
the report than in the five preceding years (44% vs. 37%).
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If market participants had interpreted the pari passu clause to forbid such conduct, holdout
creditors presumably would have invoked the clause, or at least threatened to invoke it, in legal
action against Argentina or against restructuring participants. Yet it was 2010 before the first
creditors (Elliott, of course) pressed the earmarking argument.11 Until then, only a few academics
(e.g., Olivares-Caminal 2009b:766-76; Gelpern 2005:6) had raised this possibility, and their
suggestions went unheeded by creditors. The collective shrug with which market participants
responded to these suggestions implies that few drew a meaningful connection between
earmarking and pari passu.
D. The Buchheit-Pam Story
We turn now to the relatively complex story told by Buchheit and Pam about the
evolution of pari passu. We focus on two core components of the story: that the clause appeared
only in secured sovereign debt instruments until the early 1970s, and that the clause has evolved
to deal primarily with the risk of involuntary subordination. Relative to the other stories, this one
holds up against the data. Nevertheless, it contains some flaws, and a number of questions
remain.
1. Pari Passu in Unsecured Sovereign Debt Instruments
Buchheit and Pam assert that, during the 19th and early 20th centuries, “[a] version of the
pari passu clause was routinely used … but only when the instrument benefited from collateral
security” (Buchheit & Pam 2004:894). Therefore, they conclude, the clause simply confirmed
that all bondholders would receive equal shares of the proceeds from any sale of the collateral.
With two significant caveats, this aspect of their story holds up fairly well against our
data. The first caveat is that we find the pari passu clause in multiple unsecured loans during this

11

This litigation is ongoing in the Southern District of New York.
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era (Cape of Good Hope in 1899 and 1908, St. Petersburg and Chile in 1913; Riga in 1914;
Dresden in 1927). In the documents relating to these bonds, we were unable to find any language
purporting to grant bondholders preferential access to any assets or revenues. That said,
relatively few (30/372) of the bonds issued before the end of World War II contain the pari
passu clause, and most of these (24/30) appear in loans that are at least arguably secured. These
secured loans, moreover, often were issued in multiple tranches or in multiple markets and
currencies. Our earlier discussion of the earmarking story, for example, mentioned that China
and the city of Tokyo each pledged the same revenues to secure multiple railway construction
loans. This pattern is consistent with Buchheit and Pam’s explanation.
This brings us to our second caveat. To accept this aspect of the Buchheit-Pam story, one
must take an extraordinarily broad view of what constitutes a secured loan. Given sovereign
immunity and the difficulty of finding and seizing sovereign assets, the term “security interest”
has always been something of a euphemism in this context (Borchard 1951:83). We have been
willing, however, to treat a wide range of loans as secured, including loans that contain
earmarks. One reason for this is that the loans often identified specific revenues that would
constitute security and gave lenders or creditor states substantial control over the pledged
revenues. For example, Chinese bonds issued in 1911 were secured by a “first charge” on
specified provincial revenues and, after a default, required these revenues to be administered by
the Imperial Maritime Customs Service, which was controlled by Western powers (Rauchway
1997:374).
We think it fair to characterize such loans as backed by something akin to a security
interest. But not all of our “secured” loans fit this profile. A number contain only a generic
representation that the loan constitutes a charge on the borrower’s general revenues. For
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example, English bonds issued in New York in 1901 and 1902 provided that the loan “will be a
charge on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.” It is not clear to us how, if at all, these
differ from unsecured loans. The bonds do not use language (such as “first charge”) granting
bondholders priority over other creditors. Nor do they designate specific revenues, such as
customs duties, that could be seized by force and administered for the benefit of creditors. This is
true even when the issuer (unlike the United Kingdom) might plausibly have been at risk of such
intervention.
If one treats such bonds as unsecured (as we have not), then the pari passu clause appears
with some frequency in unsecured loans both before and after World War II. This would raise
serious questions about this aspect of the Buchheit-Pam story. Moreover, there is at least one
respect in which the story is mistaken. Buchheit and Pam locate the first appearance of the pari
passu clause in unsecured debt instruments in early-1970s syndicated bank loans (2004:902). But
even under our generous conception of secured loans, the clause appeared (if rarely) in
unsecured bonds as early as 1899. Moreover, as Table 1 indicates, the clause routinely appeared
in unsecured bonds as early as the 1960s. Thus, whatever else we can say about the use of pari
passu in unsecured debt instruments, the clause did not originate in the syndicated loan contracts
of the 1970s.12
2. Involuntary Subordination
Buchheit and Pam also claim that the pari passu clause has evolved into a tool offering
protection against laws that grant preferential treatment to some unsecured creditors or that allow
one unsecured creditor to obtain priority over another without the latter’s consent. Laws such as

12

Nor do we find support for the Buchheit-Pam claim that, before the birth of the modern
pari passu clause in the 1970s, drafters used language such as “pari passu in point of charge”
(2004:894-95). Language such as this appears only twice in the bonds in our sample.
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these present traps for unwary bondholders, who rarely perform substantial due diligence into the
borrower’s local law (2004:917). Our data support aspects of this story, but for reasons that
differ from those proffered by Buchheit and Pam.
We begin by describing the ways in which our data support this story. Focusing first on
the pre-World War II era, recall that the pari passu clause often appeared when the borrower
issued debt in multiple tranches or in multiple markets and currencies. A possible explanation for
this pattern is that, but for the pari passu clause, the first-in-time rule would have conferred
priority on bondholders in the first tranche and deterred participation in the second. The clause
thus ensured that both sets of bondholders would enjoy equal priority.
At first glance, a second aspect of our data supports the involuntary subordination story.
Beginning around 1980, a new variant of the pari passu clause began to appear with some
frequency. The standard clause provides something like, “the bonds will rank pari passu with all
other unsecured External Indebtedness.” The new variant added the phrase “regardless of date of
issue” or, in some cases, “regardless of date of issue and currency of payment.” The purpose of
this language is unclear, but it is possible that drafters hoped the revised clause would ensure that
bondholders would rank equally regardless of local laws conferring priority on lenders who had
lent first in time or in local currency. To that extent, this new variant supports the link Buchheit
and Pam posit between pari passu and concerns over involuntary subordination.
Nevertheless, we remain skeptical that the modern pari passu clause should be viewed as
a tool to prevent involuntary subordination. As Figure 3 shows for English-law bonds, the new
variant decreased in frequency after the 1980s and has now largely disappeared except from
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bonds issued by a handful of issuers.13 If drafters intended the pari passu clause to prevent
subordination to first-in-time or local-currency lenders, why would they have removed the
language that explicitly addressed these risks? To be sure, if one interprets the generic pari passu
clause also to provide this protection, the additional language served little purpose. But it also
did no harm.
Figure 3. Percent of English-law bonds with "date of issue" or "date of issue
and currency of payment" mutation
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In addition, recall from Figure 2 that sovereign bonds governed by English law
increasingly have exempted from the pari passu requirement priorities required or permitted
under the borrower’s local law. The implication of such exceptions to the pari passu requirement
is that the borrower may pass laws that grant preferences to a subset of unsecured creditors or
that allow some unsecured creditors to gain priority over others. When considered together, then,
Figures 2 and 3 suggest a story that is nearly the opposite of the one told by Buchheit and Pam.
Over the past decade, sovereign bonds governed by English law increasingly have employed pari
passu language that arguably allows borrowers to create preferences through legislation (Figure
2). Moreover, sovereign bonds have gradually shed language clarifying that the equal ranking
13

This variant of the clause appears infrequently in New York-law bonds, although its use
appears to follow a similar pattern. In the random subset of New York-law bonds mentioned
earlier, the variant appeared in 6 of 9 bonds from the 1970s and 1980s and less frequently in the
1990s (4/39) and 2000s (2/75).
32

requirement applies no matter when or in what currency the debt was issued (Figure 3). If
anything, these two patterns suggest that the pari passu clause has become less focused on
involuntary subordination over time, rather than more.
E. The Gunboat Bankruptcy Story
We conclude by exploring the story that locates the pari passu clause in the era of
“gunboat diplomacy,” when creditor states supposedly backed their citizens’ foreign investments
with military force. We have noted our skepticism that gunboat diplomacy played a key role in
enforcing sovereign debt obligations. Nevertheless, there is at least one context in which the
gunboat bankruptcy hypothesis has some purchase. We capitalize on this fact to look for a
relationship between the pari passu clause and the prospect of creditor-state intervention.
In the first decades of the 20th century, a central component of U.S. foreign policy –
typically referred to as “dollar diplomacy” – consisted of arranging controlled loans to borrowers
in the Western Hemisphere (Rosenberg 1999). Borrowers would obtain financing arranged by
U.S. banks and, in return, would submit to a process of reform in which they would cede some
degree of fiscal and political autonomy to agents designated by the U.S. government or by
private bankers. Hoping to limit the influence of European powers in the hemisphere, the U.S.
also asserted, through the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, a right to intervene
“into the domestic affairs of Latin American and Caribbean countries delinquent in the payment
of their public debts” (Boyle 1999:89). In furtherance of this policy, the “United States
increasingly resorted to military and political intervention to force the repayment of foreign
debt” (Pérez, Jr. & Weissman 2006-2007:710).
We thought it plausible to assume that loan contracts would reflect this political reality.
In previous work, for example, one of us (Weidemaier 2010) had argued that lenders employed
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arbitration clauses selectively, not to facilitate a lender-borrower arbitration, but to pave the way
for post-default intervention by the United States. Similarly, we suspected that loan contracts
would be more likely to include the pari passu clause when lenders expected default to result in
a U.S.-imposed receivership. That expectation would be most reasonable in the context of early20th century loans by U.S. banks to Latin American and Caribbean borrowers such as Cuba, the
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Honduras.
Our data, however, do not bear out our expectation. True, the pari passu clause appears
with some frequency between 1890 and 1930, including in loans to Austria, Brazil, Buenos
Aires, Chile, China, Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Queensland, Riga, St. Petersburg, Sudan,
Tokyo, the United Kingdom, and Westphalia. But as even a glance at this list makes clear, these
were hardly the entities most at risk of an externally-imposed receivership. To be sure, some of
the loans were subject to a significant degree of international supervision and control.14 But few
of these borrowers fit neatly into the receivership model. It goes without saying, for example,
that the United Kingdom was not at risk of being placed into a U.S.-sponsored receivership.
Perhaps more significantly, in the bonds where we expected to find it – including Bolivia,
Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Panama, and El Salvador – we found nothing resembling a
precursor to the modern pari passu clause.
VI. REVISITING THE STORIES
If our respondents were subtly trying to induce us to undertake our own hunt for pari
passu, they succeeded. Collectively, the three of us have spent hundreds of hours digging
through old financial archives, interviewing veteran lawyers, and otherwise trying to locate the
14

Bonds issued by Hungary, Estonia, and Austria, for example, would have been arranged
under the auspices of the League of Nations as part of the League’s post-World War I
reconstruction efforts (Myers 1945:506-10). Loans to Germany were associated with the Dawes
and Young plans to fund war reparations and economic development.
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first use of pari passu in sovereign bonds. When we found the clause in secured bonds issued by
Bolivia in 1871, and in arguably-unsecured bonds issued by the United Kingdom in the early
1900s, we were elated. Surely, we thought, our respondents would be delighted to learn of our
findings. The Bolivian bonds even came with a great story featuring a colorful cast of characters,
sovereign default, and holdout litigation by early “vulture” creditors like Elliott.15 Some of the
respondents’ law firms, moreover, had handled these early deals and might still have notes from
the lawyers involved. If so, we were offering the keys to unlock the puzzle of pari passu. If the
lawyers wanted to find the origins of the clause, all they had to do was look.
There was, however, a singular lack of interest in the data we had collected. None of the
lawyers we called even requested a copy of the old bonds. “It is so interesting what you
[academics] are able to spend your time doing,” observed one lawyer in response to our findings.
This disinterest only deepened the puzzle presented by the stories themselves. In addition to
wondering why lawyers would tell origin stories in the first place, we now puzzled over why
they seemed uninterested in what we thought was the “real” story.
One unflattering answer to this conundrum is the possibility that the lawyers told stories
to obscure the role they or their firms played in producing or maintaining the problematic version
of the pari passu clause. Recall from Figure 1 that this version emerged during the 1990s and
became more prevalent thereafter, when many of our respondents were already in practice. We
also acknowledge our own role in producing these stories. After all, we were pointedly asking
the lawyers why they continued to use a problematic contract term. Respondents may have
15

The central character was the American adventurer, engineer, soldier and scientist, Colonel
George E. Church, who raised funds for an effort to build a communications system that would
connect landlocked Bolivia to the Atlantic coast. The plan proved a disaster and bondholders
sued for the return of what funds remained in trust. The suit prompted accusations that “an
unscrupulous body of commercial pirates” had bought Bolivian bonds at a discount, hoping “to
realize an enormous profit” through litigation (Craig 1907:58, 449).
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wished to project an impression consistent with the idealized image of the elite transactional
lawyer (Goffman 1959). Yet the interviews made this difficult. Instead of tactfully overlooking
the disconnect between performance and reality (Goffman 1959:229-33), we had asked
respondents to explain why sovereign debt lawyers did not behave as we expected elite
transactional lawyers to behave.
On reflection, however, we do not believe that the respondents were seeking to deflect
attention from their own practices or that their stories were substantially determined by the
context of our interviews. After all, the stories are anything but exculpatory. Whether or not
these lawyers or their firms played a role in creating the modern version of the pari passu clause,
they are using it now. If the clause is problematic, even a distinguished historical pedigree would
not justify its continued use. Moreover, although the stories were shaped by the interview
context, it is odd that respondents would tell stories that are in many respects both unflattering
and inaccurate. The stories are unflattering because they portray lawyers as rote copiers
(sometimes of the wrong form!) of terms whose meaning is unclear. And the stories are
inaccurate not only because they fail to account for the origins of pari passu, but because our
data show that sovereign bond contracts have mutated over time and therefore suggest that
sovereign debt lawyers are not rote copiers.
We remain puzzled why eminent lawyers would tell such stories in response to a question
about modern contracts. We doubt they would tell the inadvertent copying story to prospective
clients or reveal ignorance about the meaning or origin of the clause (Flood 1991:44-45). To the
contrary, we suspect they tell clients that their work involves tailoring form contracts to account
for risks specific to the client’s transaction (Suchman 2003:102; Flood 1991:58). In fact, we
know of one instance in which an issuer asked its lawyers why its pari passu clause included
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language vulnerable to Elliott’s interpretation. In reply, it received a research memorandum
explaining that a number of highly-rated issuers used similar language – suggesting that the
clause was a credibility signal that helped assure investors that default was unlikely. In other
words, the client received a functional explanation, not an origin story.
To summarize, the portrait that our lawyer-respondents paint of transactional lawyers as a
cohort does not seem to match the behavior of the same cohort of lawyers that is revealed by the
contracts. The lawyers tell stories implying that knowledge of the past is key to understanding
today’s contracts, but they ultimately are disinterested in unearthing the origin of pari passu.
Lawyers claim to be engaged in rote copying, but in fact transactional lawyers have made
seemingly systematic changes to contract documents. And lawyers suggest that their inattention
to the clause has allowed junior colleagues’ mistakes to persist for decades, when in fact lawyers
appear to have quietly but repeatedly updated the clause to suit new contexts. Several themes
emerge in these disjunctions between what the lawyers we interviewed say and what sovereign
debt lawyers actually do that potentially shed light on these “sophisticated,” but routine,
transactions.
1. Origin Myths and the Nature of Contract Change
Although respondents told conflicting stories about the pari passu clause, a common
theme runs though the stories. Respondents explained the clause not in terms of its function but
in terms of its history. This in itself is surprising. The conventional understanding of contracts is
that each term has a function and that parties choose the terms that best govern their transaction.
Consistent with this understanding, we suspect that most lawyers, if asked about a term in a
contract they had drafted, would explain what the term does and not why it was first included –
perhaps hundreds of years ago – in contracts of this sort.
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By contrast, our respondents told a dynamic, almost biological, story of contract
evolution. Respondents located the origins of pari passu in some of the most significant parts of
the last 100 or more years of sovereign debt history. Their stories recall the era of gunboat
diplomacy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the depression and resulting wave of defaults
in the 1930s, the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s, and the ensuing revival of sovereign
bond markets in the 1990s. As a whole, the stories suggest that contract terms are a function of
major historical events, beyond the power of ordinary transactional lawyers to change. The
implication is that change requires something like a seismic shift, an event sufficiently jarring to
displace deeply entrenched contracting practices.
Our data, however, show that sovereign bond contracts are not static and that the pari
passu clause has been revised in subtle ways over time. Yet these changes have generally been
modest and have occurred at the margins. It may be that major shifts in sovereign debt contract
provisions – adding or removing a term, say, rather than tinkering with its language – are driven
more by history and financial crisis than by lawyer ingenuity. Perhaps stories about the past
serve a dual function for these lawyers, both justifying their failure to do more than tinker at the
margins of contract language and giving vent to their frustration at this aspect of their practice.
At the same time, by linking sovereign debt contracts to momentous past events, and to times of
political and financial upheaval, it may be that the stories seek to convey an idealized vision of
the sovereign debt lawyer as an integral player in significant global events (Goffman 1959: 3451).
2. Contracts as Relics; Contracting as a Ritual
There is a second way in which the stories clash with a functional view of contract
language. Our sense from the interviews is that many lawyers cared about the history and
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tradition of contract language even if they could not fully articulate its function. For example,
some respondents described contract drafting as a “ritual” and likened pari passu and other
obscure provisions to “talismans” or “magic incantations.” These terms, they seemed to be
telling us, are best viewed as customary utterances that cannot be removed or changed without
disrupting the “ritual” of sovereign debt contracting. If so, their comments highlight the
ceremonial nature of contract formation and echo Mark Suchman’s description of contracts as
“social artifacts” that have symbolic and aesthetic properties, as well as technical ones (Suchman
2003; Riles 2008 & 2006).
Our respondents, however, did not portray themselves as “medieval artisans … producing
extensively hand tailored wares” (Suchman 2003:102). Nor did they describe themselves as
engaged in an intricate process in which a standard form document is “cut up, then eventually
stitched together and given new life” to advance a client’s goals (Flood 1991:58). To the
contrary, they portrayed themselves more as custodians of some ancient and sacred document,
one whose inscrutable text they would not dare to alter. To hear these lawyers describe their role
in sovereign debt transactions, they merely carried this document from ritual to ritual, much as
an acolyte might carry a candle in a religious procession. Yet we know from our dataset of
contracts that transactional lawyers frequently made small changes to their “sacred” texts.
Again, we suspect that the disjunction between story and reality stems in part from a
frustration that modern lawyers have with the nature of their professional practice. Frequently, in
our interviews, senior lawyers would talk about the lost tradition of mentorship and teaching that
characterized transactional practice of a generation ago. In that model, the wise elders of the firm
would work closely with young lawyers, passing down the history of contract language and
showing how to tailor new terms for modern clients. But the current “big law” business model,
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with the pressures of high associate salaries, client demands, and lateral moves by partners,
provides neither the time nor the inclination to train junior lawyers. These pressures also mean
that senior lawyers can no longer invest in their own human capital: “It used to be a craft, not a
business,” said one frustrated respondent. “Today’s clients are simply not willing to subsidize the
[necessary] mentoring and training,” complained another. A third told a story that also invoked
frustrations associated with contract boilerplate. In this story, the respondent pointed out during a
negotiation that a form contract developed by the opposing lawyer’s firm mistakenly omitted an
entire line, turning part of the contract into “gibberish.” The other lawyer – a junior associate –
adamantly refused to correct the mistake and defended this intransigence by noting that he had
no authority to change his firm’s standard form.
Stories like these seem to highlight the frustrations many respondents experience in
connection with their practice. Stories about sovereign debt “rituals” may give voice to this
frustration while still conveying some of the importance that we suspect these lawyers attribute
to their work. Indeed, by emphasizing the history and tradition associated with sovereign
borrowing, perhaps the stories seek to legitimize the relatively stagnant nature of sovereign debt
contracts (cf. Hobsbawm 1983). Transactional lawyers may not design innovative contracts, the
stories seem to imply, but they play a central, even sacramental, role in the ritual of sovereign
debt.
3. From the Head of Zeus…
The disjunctions between the stories of our lawyer-respondents and the observed
behavior of sovereign debt lawyers may also have been a function of the questions we posed.
Sovereign debt lawyers typically enjoy elite status, even among lawyers who work at prestigious
global law firms. The public revelation that they were using a contract term that none of them
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fully understood likely was at odds with their professional self image. Moreover, many
respondents felt constrained by institutional pressures from amending sovereign debt contracts to
prevent another occurrence similar to the Elliott litigation. Stories that present contract terms as a
function of historical events offer an implicit explanation for this lack of control. Likewise,
stories that liken contract terms to “magic incantations” and “talismans” lend an exoticism, even
grandeur, to sovereign debt practice that reinforces the inability of individual lawyers to amend
contract terms. Even the inadvertent copying story, to which we now turn, arguably reflects
lawyers’ perceived powerlessness to shape the terms of sovereign debt contracts.
The inadvertent copying story posits that lawyers copied the pari passu clause over and
over in each new transaction after mistakenly borrowing it from corporate bond documents. This
is a remarkable way for elite lawyers to describe their professional skills. Yet respondents told a
version of this story in a number of contexts. For example, when presented with evidence that the
pari passu clause had changed over time – for example, by increasingly employing “medium
risk” language (Figure 1) or by including an exception for preferences mandated by local law in
English-law bonds (Figure 2) – some senior lawyers attributed these changes as well to blind
copying. They suggested that a junior associate may have unilaterally and mistakenly modified
contract language and that this error was perpetuated in new contracts.
We think it strange that distinguished lawyers would tell a story that renders them at least
inferentially complicit in such sloppy practices. But the story is just that – a story. Like the
contracts themselves, the behavior of the respondents during the interviews suggests a different
reality. Most respondents demonstrated a thorough familiarity with the key contract terms, often
fluently discussing contract language without referring to an exemplar. In short, respondents did
not behave like professionals who would or could easily overlook newly-introduced language.
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Nor did any of the respondents offer a compelling explanation for why, in a firm where rote
copying was the supposed norm, junior associates would have been introducing new language
that altered the apparent meaning of established boilerplate, much less doing so without calling
attention to the changes made. Few would challenge the claim that, in reality, junior associates at
a large, elite law firm do what they are told (Wilkins & Gulati 1998:1636-38).
The inadvertent copying story may be implausible and hard to square with our data, but it
may also serve an important purpose for the lawyers who tell it. One possibility is that lawyers
do not wish to be seen as making changes to documents that are supposed to be standardized.
Sovereign bonds are tradable documents, and market participants may not wish to invest time
and resources in investigating the meaning of new contract language. This puts transactional
lawyers in something of a bind. Their experience may suggest ways to refine existing contract
language, and their sense of what lawyers are supposed to do tells them that they should
implement the change. Yet they are not likely to be rewarded for their efforts by clients and
bankers who simply want the deal to go through without additional diligence costs. Perhaps
stories of relentless and inadvertent copying are valuable precisely because they are false; they
obscure the fact that lawyers frequently do amend contract language in ways they regard as
inconsequential.
A second possibility links the lawyer-as-copier narratives to stories that emphasize the
historic pedigree or “talismanic” nature of the pari passu clause. Central to each story is the
notion of the lawyer as powerless to change standard form contract terms. Some junior lawyers
told something of a counter-narrative, one in which an heroic figure rises above the constraints
imposed by history and legal culture. These stories invoked a different model of lawyering
practiced by a few giants of the field. One junior lawyer described walking into his first deal

42

where an eminent lawyer arrived with nothing but a blank yellow pad and a fountain pen. There
were no copies of prior deal documents on the conference table to be marked up. According to
the story, the great lawyer simply asked the client’s representative, a ministry of finance official:
“How can we help you?” Then, as the ministry of finance official described what the client
wanted, the lawyer began to draft clauses on the yellow pad from scratch. “It was as if the
provisions were flowing directly from the head of Zeus,” said this junior associate. “I had never
seen anything like it before.” We heard another variant of this story, not involving a yellow pad
or fountain pen, but making the same point.
What makes the story notable is that it presents the classic model of transactional
lawyering – in which a lawyer designs a bespoke contract for a client’s unique needs – as
something of a heroic ideal. Only super-human lawyers, the story seems to imply, can rise above
the intellectual, experiential, and status-based constraints that bind other lawyers to a more
mundane professional existence. The implication is that respondents find the routine use of form
documents a distasteful aspect of their practice. Perhaps the story justifies this unpleasant aspect
of their job by suggesting that one could hardly expect otherwise from mere mortals, who are
relegated to rote copying. Perhaps, too, these lawyers were suggesting that the form contracts –
for which they bear no responsibility – are the real cause of snafus like the pari passu saga.
Maybe they were telling us that such problems would not arise if contracts were drafted
differently; from scratch, using a fountain pen, on a yellow legal pad.
VII. CONCLUSION
In The Method of Hope, the anthropologist Hirokazu Miyazaki describes his ethnographic
research among the Suvavou people of Fiji, who for generations have sought compensation for
the loss of their ancestral land. Many times during his research, Miyazaki heard of a “hidden
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document,” lost somewhere in government archives, that would validate the Suvavou claim. The
document was an obsession for many Suvavou, for government officials, and ultimately for
Miyazaki himself. Yet months of research in government archives turned up no lost document.
What was interesting, Miyazaki ultimately concluded, was the idea of the document, and the
hope it sustained, rather than the truth or existence of the document itself.
Prompted by our respondents’ origin stories, we spent much of this project engaged in
our own hunt for pari passu. And unlike Miyazaki, we found our lost document, or something
close to it. So we were disappointed, to say the least, when our respondents were largely
disinterested in our discovery. Their lack of interest, however, may be revealing. The themes that
emerge from our respondents’ stories highlight the disconnect between the idealized model of
transactional lawyering and the everyday reality of sovereign debt legal work. In a sense, the
stories help bridge that divide by providing an explanation for lawyers’ relative powerlessness
and by imbuing the “ritual” of sovereign debt contracting with meaning. Perhaps what mattered,
in the end, was not that the clause had any particular origin, but simply that it had an origin, one
grounded in remote but significant events.
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Appendix
Issuers, by frequency of appearance
Issuer
Argentina
Finland
Belgium
Sweden
Portugal
Mexico
China
Brazil
Italy
Greece
Philippines
Uruguay
Colombia
Denmark
Iceland
Turkey
Chile
Russia
Venezuela
Australia
Malaysia
Buenos Aires
Austria
Jamaica
Japan
New Zealand
Ireland
Panama
Lithuania
Norway
Poland
Spain
Canada
Croatia
United Kingdom
Costa Rica
Saudi Arabia
Indonesia
Peru
Cyprus
Germany
Barbados
El Salvador
France
Hungary
Israel
Romania
South Africa

Freq. Pct. of Total
65
4.8%
58
4.3%
57
4.2%
47
3.5%
45
3.3%
42
3.1%
41
3.0%
36
2.6%
33
2.4%
31
2.3%
29
2.1%
28
2.1%
27
2.0%
27
2.0%
27
2.0%
25
1.8%
24
1.8%
24
1.8%
24
1.8%
21
1.5%
21
1.5%
19
1.4%
18
1.3%
18
1.3%
18
1.3%
18
1.3%
17
1.3%
17
1.3%
16
1.2%
15
1.1%
15
1.1%
15
1.1%
14
1.0%
14
1.0%
14
1.0%
13
1.0%
13
1.0%
11
0.8%
11
0.8%
10
0.7%
10
0.7%
9
0.7%
9
0.7%
9
0.7%
9
0.7%
9
0.7%
9
0.7%
9
0.7%
Czech Rep./Czechoslovakia
8
0.6%
Korea
8
0.6%
New South Wales
8
0.6%
British Guiana
7
0.5%
Dominican Republic
7
0.5%
Lebanon
7
0.5%
Qatar
7
0.5%
Bulgaria
6
0.4%
Ceylon
6
0.4%
Belize
5
0.4%
Bolivia
5
0.4%

Issuer
Freq. Pct. of Total
Cuba
5
0.4%
Egypt
5
0.4%
Salvador
5
0.4%
Thailand
5
0.4%
Kazakhstan
4
0.3%
Latvia
4
0.3%
Slovakia
4
0.3%
Sudan
4
0.3%
Trinidad &Tobago
4
0.3%
Bergen
3
0.2%
Cape of Good Hope
3
0.2%
Ecuador
3
0.2%
Estonia
3
0.2%
Guatemala
3
0.2%
Morocco
3
0.2%
Queensland
3
0.2%
Serbia
3
0.2%
Switzerland
3
0.2%
Western Australia
3
0.2%
Aruba
2
0.1%
Bahamas
2
0.1%
Belarus
2
0.1%
Berlin
2
0.1%
Cordoba (Argentina) 2
0.1%
Danzig
2
0.1%
Fiji
2
0.1%
Grenada
2
0.1%
Honduras
2
0.1%
Iran
2
0.1%
Iraq
2
0.1%
Kenya
2
0.1%
Liberia
2
0.1%
Manitoba
2
0.1%
Mauritius
2
0.1%
Ottoman Empire
2
0.1%
Pakistan
2
0.1%
Paraguay
2
0.1%
San Paulo
2
0.1%
Seychelles
2
0.1%
Siam
2
0.1%
Slovenia
2
0.1%
South Carolina
2
0.1%
Tokyo
2
0.1%
Trinidad
2
0.1%
Tucuman
2
0.1%
Ukraine
2
0.1%
Victoria
2
0.1%
Abu Dhabi
1
0.1%
Aden
1
0.1%
Antigua
1
0.1%
Antofagasta
1
0.1%
Auckland
1
0.1%
Bahrain
1
0.1%
Bengal
1
0.1%
Budapest
1
0.1%
Calgary
1
0.1%
Christiana
1
0.1%
City of Johannesburg 1
0.1%
City of Yokohama
1
0.1%
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Issuer
Congo
Copenhagen
Dresden
Dubai
Dutch East Indies
Edmonton
Fed. Malay States
Gabon
Georgia
Ghana
Hamburg
Helsinki
India
Kieff
Louisiana
Luxembourg
Macedonia
Madras
Maisonneuve
Malaya
Micronesia
Milan
Moldova
Montenegro
Natal
New Brunswick
Newfoundland
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Oman
Oslo
Oxaca (Mexico)
Palestine
Perth
Poyais
Pretoria
Prince Albert
Rhodesia & Nyasaland

Riga
Rosario
Santa Fe (argentina)
Santos
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Silesia
South Australia
Southern Rhodesia
St. Chris./Nevis/Anguilla

St. Petersburg
St. Vincent
Stockholm
Sydney
Tanganyika
Tasmania
Vietnam
Warsaw
Westphalia

Freq. Pct. of Total
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
1
0.1%

Issuances By Decade
Decade
1820s
1830s
1840s
1850s
1860s
1870s
1880s
1890s
1900s
1910s
1920s
1930s
1940s
1950s
1960s
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000+

N
6
1
0
6
19
23
21
24
47
74
85
59
11
14
38
28
108
325
471

Percent of Total
0.4%
0.1%
0.0%
0.4%
1.4%
1.7%
1.5%
1.8%
3.5%
5.4%
6.3%
4.3%
0.8%
1.0%
2.8%
2.1%
7.9%
23.9%
34.6%
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Pari Passu usage over time, secured and unsecured bonds

Pre-1860
1860-1879
1880-1899
1900-1919
1920-1939
1940-1959
1960-1979
1980-1999
2000-present

Secured Bonds
Pari Passu
No Pari Passu
0
8
1
18
2
17
8
49
12
47
0
14
0
8
0
0
0
0
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Unsecured Bonds
Pari Passu
No Pari Passu
0
5
0
23
1
25
4
60
1
84
0
11
48
10
395
38
469
2

Total
13
42
45
121
144
25
66
433
471

Post WW-II pari passu mutations (unsecured bonds with pari passu only)
Number of bonds
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000‐present

Level of risk of Elliott interpretation (Fig. 1)

Mutations (English law only) (Fig. 2 & 3)

Total

With pari passu

Low

Medium

High

N, English law bonds

Exception for "mandatory" law

Date of issue or currency of payment mutation

28
108
325
471

20
88
307
469

20
82
194
205

0
0
97
232

0
6
16
32

11
35
123
171

0
2
12
64

1
16
39
23

